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By Xiangming Chen & Garth Myers
The relations between China and Africa have become increasingly complex over the last
four decades. As China’s economic ties with Africa go beyond commodity-dominant
trade, Xiangming Chen & Garth Myers consider China’s activities in Africa’s broader
economy with a focus on urban infrastructure.
Back in the early 1970s, the Chinese Dining Hall of Xinqiao Hotel in Beijing where Xiangming
Chen worked as a waiter was a favorable spot for Tanzanian and Zambian engineering students
to drink beer. They were in Beijing to learn how to operate the railroad between the two
countries that China began to build in 1970 and completed in 1975. Despite being very poor,
China put up $500 million to build the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, the largest single foreign-aid
project undertaken by China at the time. The irony then was that a good number of these
African students were known to be the sons of government officials with whom China shared a
strong socialist ideology.
If we fast forward to the 21st century, we see that while China and Africa remain connected,
their relations have become considerably different and much more complex than four decades
ago. The new China-Africa relationship is defined by the rapid growth and broader scale of their
economic ties. While negligible two decades ago, China-Africa trade reached $200 billion in
2012, a historical high (see Figure 1 on the next page), which makes China Africa’s largest
trading partner today. With only limited investment in Africa before the 2000s, China’s
cumulative investment in Africa reached $21 billion in 2012, with over 2,000 Chinese companies

operating across the continent. Of China’s various forms of foreign aid that rose from $1.8 billion
in 2001 to over $20 billion a year today,1 a huge chunk went to Africa. African investment in
China rose from $280 million in 2002 to $1.31 billion in 2009. There is a growing community of
over 100,000 African traders and merchants working and living in a sort of ethnic enclave in the
southern Chinese metropolis of Guangzhou2 (Canton)–a historical trading enclave in and
gateway to China after 1760.
“The new China-Africa relationship has become much more complex than four decades
ago. It is defined by the rapid growth and broader scale of their economic ties.”
Given these aggregate trade and investment figures, China and Africa may appear to have a
good two-way relationship. Yet most people see it as lopsided, given China’s massive economic
footprint and influence throughout Africa across its energy, commodity, manufacturing, and
infrastructure sectors. One commentator calls ‘the rise of China in Africa arguably the most
important development for the continent since the end of the Cold War’. 3 The renowned singer
Bono, who has focused most of his global activist and charity work on AIDS in Africa, recently
characterised China’s expansion in Africa as one of the most important geopolitical faux pas of
the 21st century that the United States and Europe should confront.4 A hyperbole or not, Bono’s
comment sheds a bright spotlight on the global long-term significance of China in Africa.

Looming Long and Large in Africa
The famous Anglo-American poet W. H. Auden (1907-1973) wrote about China and Africa
coming together. Little did he know that the Chinese have been coming to Africa for over 500
years. In the early 1400s, the legendary explorer Zheng He commanded a fleet that went as far
as the east coast of Africa. To prove this record, Chinese and Kenyan archeologists have been
searching the African coast for the fabled wreck of a junk, and have recently identified several
shipwrecks of interest off the Kenyan coast. During the late 1800s, the Chinese went to South
Africa to mine minerals mostly as indentured workers. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway in the
1970s typified Maoist China’s development aid to ideologically left regimes in Africa, while
China’s African engagement during the ‘reform and opening up’ era has been more
economically pragmatic.
“The number of Chinese living in Africa has grown from a few thousand a decade ago to
between one and two million, mostly businesspeople, across the continent today.”

Relative to any of the previous eras, China has significantly speeded and scaled up its ties with
and presence in Africa. China’s trade with Africa soared 700% from 2000-2010, way ahead of
trade of India, the European Union, and the United States with Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa
accounted for 14% of China’s outbound investment during 2005-2010 (see Figure 1). The
number of Chinese living in Africa has grown from a few thousand a decade ago to between
one and two million, mostly businesspeople, across the continent today. They drill in the oil
fields of Angola, Niger, and Sudan, mine in the copper belt of Zambia, sell small merchandise in
the Chinatown of Johannesburg and at the central market in Nairobi, build new gated
communities in Lusaka, completed the Bui Dam in Ghana, and continue the joint agri-business
projects in Mali and Sierra Leone which started in the 1980s.5
Some might see China’s extensive footprint in Africa as a scramble for its badly needed energy
and natural resources, much like some of China’s deals in Latin America, Central Asia, and
Southeast Asia.6 This is largely true given Africa’s heavy dependency on commodity exports
and the content of China-Africa trade. Of the 45 Sub-Saharan African countries, commodities
account for at least one quarter of total exports in 20 countries including the three largest
economies of Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa. Almost 80% of China’s imports from Africa are
mineral products, while machinery made up 29% of China’s exports to Africa (see Figure 2 on
next page). China’s huge demand for African commodities helped Africa’s GDP grow 5.5%
annually over the last decade, although this growth is slowing as China’s own economic growth
has cooled off. As China’s economic ties with Africa go beyond commodity-dominant trade, we
focus on China’s activities in Africa’s broader economy with a focus on the urban infrastructure,
which has not drawn nearly as much global attention.
China’s Urban Impact in Africa
China’s impacts and interactions at Africa’s urban scale are transforming its forms and fabrics.
Sub-Saharan Africa is the least urbanised and most rapidly urbanising world region at the same
time, and rates of urbanisation have not followed conventional Western models, where
urbanisation is driven by industrialisation. One major spatial consequence of the trend of
demographic growth without corresponding economic growth is that the substantial physical
expansion of the urban footprint, typically on the peri-urban edges of cities occurs in a manner
dominated by informality, devoid of substantial formal planning.
The phenomenon of peri-urban informality connects with the China-Africa narrative in two ways.
First, the increasing Chinese residency in cities in Africa is tangible in the built environment,
housing markets, and urban culture, and the changes resonate outward to the peri-urban areas
of the continent. In Dakar, the main zone of Chinese settlement is a generally middle-class area
around the Boulevard de Centenaire built in the 1950s and ‘meant to resemble Avenue des
Champs Elysées’, according to Kouoh.7 In Nairobi, it is a similarly middle class zone west of
downtown – a formerly white-only segment of the colonial map.
“Chinese settlers reside all over the middle- and upper-class zones of Lusaka, whilst the
most symbolic presence comes in the Chinese dominance of Lusaka’s Millennium
Village, a gated corporate business park originally built to house the Presidents of the
African Union for their 2000 Summit.”
While both in Dakar and Nairobi large highway projects are meeting long-recognised
transportation infrastructure needs, the routes directly disadvantage peri-urban Pikine and
Kibera residents. Kibera – already bisected by the swirling Kenya Railways – has been further
sliced in half by the Chinese-built Southern Bypass Highway. This highway’s purpose is ‘to

connect from Karen [among Nairobi’s richest suburbs] all the way to the airport and then to
Thika Road, but they just go and do it, there is no engagement with the community. This bypass
cuts through the forest, through plots, and we have no discussion of participation’.8

The speculative residential construction at the economic high end led by this Chinese
investment drives up the price of urban real estate further beyond the reach of ordinary
residents, driving more people to places like Pikine or Kibera, where informal construction then
further displaces people. Pikine’s severe floods led to a strong presence in the built environment
of abandoned houses; combined with the rising costs of remaining housing, community leaders
see the rise of both severe overcrowding (30 to 40 people in one house) and out-migration of
Pikinois to rural areas. The Chinese-built superhighway to Thika, just northeast of Nairobi,
fueled a land rush in the fertile coffee lands of Kiambu County.

Chinese settlers reside all over the middle- and upper-class zones of Lusaka, but perhaps the
most dramatically symbolic presence comes in the Chinese dominance of Lusaka’s Millennium
Village, a gated corporate business park originally built to house the Presidents of the African
Union for their 2000 Summit. The Village’s Henan-Guoji Development Company is developing
Silverest Gardens (see Exhibit 1) 10 kilometers beyond the Lusaka airport, promising a
‘rationally planned and comfortable living environment’ for those who can afford houses that
cost in the neighborhood of $200,000. Silverest Gardens claims to be the ‘community changing
the city’, but it provides no housing for any of the service workers for its 380 homes, indirectly
leading to the creation of a new peri-urban informal settlement for them, cut off from the city,
since its residents will have to provide for themselves in every sense.
In Lusaka, China-built middle- and upper-class housing estates are steadily displacing
longstanding peri-urban informal settlements – occasionally with violence, as in June 2013’s
forced removal of Kampasa settlement near the Lusaka airport. Kampasa long housed informal
workers for the Zambia National Service camp and the local, white-owned peri-urban
agribusiness giant, Galounia Farm, but when these two owners sold adjoining parcels to a
Chinese firm, the military rolled in with no warning and displaced the residents, shooting and
killing several in the process.9
Is China Good for Africa?
This is not an easy question to which there is a clear-cut yes-no answer. There are two
comparative ways to assess the balance of evidence bearing on this question. Relative to its
early years of providing official foreign aid to Africa almost half a century ago, China now has a
much more diversified presence and influence in Africa through both government and private
channels, or their combination. In helping Africa set up special economic zones, China has
transplanted its relatively successful developmental strategy with market-based decisions and
investment by its private companies in these zones.10 Retaining an old focus on infrastructure,

China has scaled it up by rehabilitating the 840-mile Benguela railway line that now connects
Angola’s Atlantic coast with the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. This kind of largescale infrastructure, which would not have been built without China, has won it some praises.
“China now has a much more diversified presence and influence in Africa through both
government and private channels, or their combination.”
Unlike the old European colonialists and the more recent Western aid programs, China has
claimed not to intervene in the domestic political affairs of African countries but tried to focus on
economic cooperation. In fact, an editorial in China’s official newspaper The People’s Daily (on
August 20, 2013) advocated the coming together of ‘The Chinese Dream’ and ‘The African
Dream’ through mutually beneficial trade and investment to alleviate poverty and achieve
sustainable development. The reality in Africa however is quite different. The Chad government
has recently shut down oil operations by China after discovering that they had dumped excess
oil in ditches and asked local workers to remove it without protection.11 This clearly contradicts
China’s official rhetoric regarding its intention to do good in Africa. By proclaiming political noninterference, China ends up giving some pretext and legitimacy to the authoritarian
governments in Africa to continue governing as they wish.
There is a danger in praising Chinese investments in Africa without noting the human rights
costs of China’s strictly business mindset in Africa. Zambia makes a fascinating case study for
this. While Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo12 finds claims of labor abuse by Chinese firms in
her native Zambia ‘worth investigating’, she contends that ‘the evidence is… sketchy’ for these
claims, citing, as a counter-weight, a 2007 Pew survey of public opinions in some African
countries suggesting a more favorable view toward the Chinese than toward Western aid
donors. Nearly a decade of research in Zambia runs against Moyo’s argument though. More
than a half-dozen other researchers have documented the highly negative outcomes of Chinese
investments there. These can be seen in low wages, poor working conditions, horrible health
and safety conditions, exacerbating inequalities, importation of low-skilled workers and a failure
to build backward and forward linkages in Zambia’s economic interest. 13 Zambia’s macroeconomic indicators have improved in the last decade, but its micro-economic and social
development indicators have barely budged. China’s role in African economic development,
though based on a different calculation of what constitutes aid, is starting to have many of the
flaws that scholars like Moyo want to attach to Western aid programs alone.
“As African countries and leaders become more alert in their dealings with China,
African citizens can play an important role in holding their leaders to be more
accountable in critically examining the deals with Beijing. There can be a win-win
situation for the China-Africa relationship.”
The China-Africa nexus is as complex as it has been described in the news media and analysed
by informed scholars. It has a very long way to go in playing out fully for the world to see. There
are many double sides to this evolving development. Having brought much needed new
investment to Africa, China has not created as many jobs for locals as expected, although
factories in a special economic zone in Zambia employed only one Chinese for every four local
workers, for example.14 China’s reluctance to hire more local African workers can be attributed
to its avoiding training and management costs including the language barrier.While China has
built extensive urban infrastructure in and between African cities, its quality is not as good as it
should be. Continuing to work with the Zimbabwean government of President Robert Mugabe,
China has also developed relations with its opposition. China provides aid and investment to
both democratic and non-democratic regimes alike. Despite Africa’s dependence on China for

exporting its rich commodities, less demand from China due its slower economic growth can
open up new opportunities for African countries to pursue alternative and more sustainable
development strategies. In one such example, the China-Africa Overseas Leather Products
tannery, located just outside Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, has hired 450 workers at $37-$53 a month,
which are much lower rates than in China and most other parts of Asia. But it takes more than
40 days to bring soaking chemicals from China to the factory due to poor and highly inefficient
transport infrastructure.15 It circles back to China’s heavy investment in urban infrastructure in
Africa as a necessary condition for supporting labor-intensive manufacturing that can sustain
economic growth in the long run.

Given its already strong foothold in Africa and its economic capacity, China will be better off
maintaining its pragmatic and no-strings-attached approach in managing its relations with Africa.
In dealing with the economic giant, African leaders will need to step up in protecting their
countries’ interests as Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda have set new restrictions on the
industries and areas for Chinese operation. Botswana’s president, Ian Khama, recently said that
‘we are going to be looking very carefully at any company that originates from China in providing
construction services’.16 As African countries and leaders become more alert in their dealings
with China, African citizens can play an important role in holding their leaders to be more
accountable in critically examining the deals with Beijing.17 There can be a win-win situation for
the increasingly close China-Africa relationship. The whole world is waiting to see it unfold in the
21st century.
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